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FDI DETERMINANTS IN THE EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION 
COUNTRIES AND EURASIAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION EFFECT  
ON FDI INFLOWS 1
The paper examines the potential determinants of foreign direct investment inflows into the region of 
Eurasian Economic Union, as well as incentives for investment into other neighboring countries. In the 
first model, the authors test a hypothesis on country specific foreign direct investment determinants for the 
Eurasian Economic Union region. The results of fixed effects estimation show that gross domestic product, 
infrastructure development and secondary education enrollment have a positive statistically significant ef-
fect on the foreign direct investment inflows into the region. Conversely, the impact of Customs Union on for-
eign direct investment appeared to be negative. Furthermore, in the second model of the natural experiment, 
the authors empirically test the hypothesis on Customs Union’s effect on foreign direct investment while con-
trolling for both country and time effects. The model includes evaluating the impact of the policy change on 
foreign investment inflows. The natural experiment outcome also points to the negative effect of Eurasian 
economic integration on foreign direct investment inflows. Although the countries of Eurasian Economic 
Union have relatively business friendly regulations, such procedures as enforcing contracts, resolving insol-
vencies and dealing with construction permits are time-consuming. For attracting foreign investment, it is 
advisable to facilitate such procedures and make the process of setting up a new business less onerous. The 
research can be used as an outline for further examining of Eurasian economic integration and apart from 
that, the study results can be applied for practical purposes of policy elaboration aimed at stimulating for-
eign direct investment into the Eurasian Economic Union. 
Keywords: foreign direct investment, determinants, Eurasian economic integration, Customs Union, natural ex-
periment model, panel estimation, fixed effects, investment climate, market size, infrastructure development 
1. Introduction
Foreign direct investment (FDI) can signifi-
cantly affect the economic growth of develop-
ing countries through technology, knowledge and 
skills transfer. FDI can be classified into horizon-
tal, that takes a form of a new subsidiary in the 
host country and vertical, which is the production 
of intermediary goods in the host country. The 
common FDI determinants include market size, 
economic and political stability, favorable invest-
1 © Akhmetzaki Ye. Zh., Mukhamediyev B. M. Text. 2017.
ment climate, natural resources, labor abundance, 
infrastructure development and other factors. 
The Asian region is the largest FDI host re-
cipient in the global economy, where FDI inflows 
amounted to USD 541 billion in 2015. One of its 
major reasons is an intensive investment liber-
alization of the developing Asian countries. . For 
instance, in 2015, 85 percent of investment pol-
icy measures were noted as favorable for foreign 
firms 2. 
2 UNCTAD, 2016. World Investment Report. Investor Nationality: 
Policy Challenges. United Nations New York and Geneva. 
Retrieved from: http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/
wir2016_en.pdf (date of access: 01.02.2017).
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The majority of developing countries realized 
potential benefits of FDI early on and as one would 
expect today competition for attracting invest-
ment suggests official commitments, like bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs), free trade agreements 
(FTAs) with investment provisions, reforms in do-
mestic investment policies, which would enhance 
FDI inflows. Free trade agreements might lead to 
trade creation and trade diversion effects, apart 
from that FTAs might affect the FDI directed to 
the region. This paper seeks to analyze the poten-
tial FDI determinants of Eurasian Economic Union 
(EAEU) countries and identify if there is any effect 
of Eurasian economic integration on FDI inflows 
of the region. 
The structure of the paper is the following. 
Section 2 provides the literature and theoreti-
cal aspects. Section 3 includes a descriptive over-
view of the EAEU countries’ FDI inflows and in-
vestment climate characteristics. Section 4 pre-
sents the main methodology and results of 2 em-
pirical models: potential FDI determinants and 
Eurasian economic integration; the natural exper-
iment model of Eurasian economic integration ef-
fect on FDI inflows. Section 5 concludes with a dis-
cussion, the implication of results and comments 
on further research. 
2. Literature Review: FDI Determinants  
and Regional Integration Effects on FDI
Numerous studies devoted to FDI and its role 
in the economy find positive spillover effects as-
sociated with FDI, such as technology and skills 
transfer, resulting in greater economic growth. For 
example, Borensztein et al. found that through 
technology transfer FDI exerts a positive statisti-
cally significant impact on GDP growth of a devel-
oping host country, given that it has a minimum 
level of human capital [1]. In general, Blomstrom 
and Kokko highlight that “foreign multinational 
companies (MNCs) may:
— contribute to efficiency by breaking supply 
bottlenecks (but that the effect may become less 
important as the technology of the host country 
advances);
— introduce new know-how by demonstrating 
new technologies and training workers who later 
take employment in local firms;
— either break down monopolies and stimulate 
competition and efficiency or create a more mo-
nopolistic industry structure, depending on the 
strength and responses of the local firms;
— transfer techniques for inventory and qual-
ity control and standardization to their local sup-
pliers and distribution channels; 
— force local firms to increase their managerial 
efforts, or to adopt some of the marketing tech-
niques used by MNCs, either on the local market 
or internationally” [2, p. 10]. 
Moreover, Blomstrom and Kokko point that in 
order to achieve the technology spillover, it is es-
sential to encourage the local companies’ willing-
ness to acquire new technologies from the MNCs 
and invest in new technologies. They indicate that 
incentives should target both multinational and 
local firms, and stimulate research and develop-
ment, training and linkages between MNCs and 
local firms. Furthermore, the countries are recom-
mended to improve their infrastructure develop-
ment, as well as business climate, and promote the 
human capital education [2, p. 19–21].
In contrast, there are possible negative FDI out-
comes, likewise, Glass and Saggi found that in the 
case of oligopolistic industries FDI effect on wages 
in a host country might be positive, whereas, FDI 
effect in a parent country will tend to be negative, 
leading to the decline of wages [3]. De Mello ex-
amined the effect of FDI on the growth of total 
factor productivity and found that FDI leads to a 
long-run growth through knowledge transfer and 
new technologies; however, FDI’s growth elevat-
ing effect is strongly connected with complemen-
tarity (or substitution) effects between FDI and 
domestic capital [4]. 
The investment decision-making process for 
FDI is interconnected with trade theory, which 
has been more heavily researched, both theoret-
ically and empirically. Nevertheless, there is a 
growing literature on FDI. High trade costs may 
induce the export-platform FDI when the multi-
national enterprise will gain more by locating in 
a host country via an affiliate company and sell-
ing goods to firms in other countries. Helpman 
provides a general literature overview on foreign 
trade and investment, further focusing on multi-
national corporations. Helpman highlights that 
the most productive companies tend to settle in a 
foreign market through an affiliate, medium level 
productive companies will export goods and ser-
vices to other countries, while the least produc-
tive ones will be competitive only in their home 
countries. Helpman indicates that low production 
costs through reduced labor cost is the primary in-
centive for vertical FDI [5]. In his other research, 
Helpman underscores that a firm, which decides 
on FDI over exporting will face higher fixed costs, 
on the other hand, it will also have less variable 
unit costs due to no trade expenditures [6]. 
Grossman et al. examined the potential equi-
librium integration choices for firms. In the case 
of fixed costs for assembling in a country other 
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than home and no transport costs, only firms with 
intermediate productivity and most productive 
firms get involved in FDI. The former tend to pur-
sue the partial FDI scheme by producing interme-
diates in the host country, importing back inter-
mediate products to home country for assembling 
and afterwards exporting to other countries; the 
latter companies tend to set production of inter-
mediate goods and assembling in the host coun-
try, further followed by exporting final goods to 
home market and to other countries. On the con-
trary, the least productive companies do not get 
involved in FDI; they produce and assemble in 
the home country, and export their final goods to 
other countries. Furthermore, as the fixed costs 
associated with the location of intermediate pro-
duction in other country increase, the companies 
tend to produce and assemble intermediate goods 
at home country [7]. 
Similarly, Greenaway and Kneller discuss firm 
heterogeneity and exporting and investing de-
cisions of companies. The conclusions are that 
firms with high productivity are able to export, 
while less productive ones operate only in the 
domestic market. Although, establishing a sub-
sidiary abroad assumes the reduction of variable 
costs such as transportation, the fixed costs will 
rise due to the firm’s operation in the host market. 
Companies will incur sunk costs in both cases: in 
exports due to marketing, advertising and distri-
bution, while in FDI due to arranging required fa-
cilities for a new plant [8].
Multinational companies’ decisions to in-
vest depend on myriad factors and are subject to 
change from one country to another. Dunning’s 
OLI framework encompasses such advantages as 
ownership, location and internalization as main 
incentives for MNC’s decision to invest abroad. 
Faeth summarizes it as follows:”… empirical 
studies testing the OLI framework have found 
FDI to be determined by a combination of own-
ership advantages, market size and characteris-
tics, factor costs, transport costs, protection and 
other factors including regime type, infrastruc-
ture, property rights and industrial disputes.” 
[9, p. 174]. In addition, Dunning argues that in-
vestment can be differentiated as initial and se-
quential ones. The initial investment involves 
resource-seeking and market-seeking motives, 
comprising natural resources, labor resources 
and market. The sequential investment includes 
efficiency-seeking and strategic-asset-seeking 
motives, which involve production rationaliza-
tion and targeting the advanced regional strat-
egy for a company [10]. 
Moudatsou and Kyrkilis draw attention on 
the analysis of FDI and economic growth in the 
European Union (EU) and Association of South 
Eastern Asian Nations (ASEAN) encompassing 
1970–2003 period. They found that a positive im-
pact of host country’s economic growth on FDI at-
traction is referred to both developing and devel-
oped countries [11]. 
The latest study of FDI determinants of Central 
and Eastern European countries by Jimborean and 
Kelber shows that euro area’s financial and mac-
roeconomic conditions, as well as global risk en-
vironment and global macroeconomic conditions, 
have a significant impact on FDI inflows of these 
countries. Additionally, they highlight infrastruc-
ture development, market size, tertiary school 
enrollment rate, previous FDI flows, corporate 
tax system, country’s accession to the European 
Union, structural reforms, risk premium, coun-
try’s competitiveness and trade openness as cru-
cial host country FDI determinants [12].
Similarly, Bevan and Estrin conducted research 
on foreign direct investment flows from European 
Union countries to selected transition economies; 
the results are consistent with market-seeking 
and efficiency-seeking patterns of FDI, as the GDP 
size, reduced labor costs and proximity of coun-
tries are found to be significant factors. Another 
notable aspect of the research was the impact of 
the future inclusion of the country into EU mem-
bership on FDI inflows: countries with the pros-
pect of inclusion into the EU tended to attract 
more foreign inflows, which further accelerated 
their economic growth. They claimed that FDI in-
flows might be negatively affected when the likeli-
hood of country’s accession in the EU membership 
is uncertain and takes longer time [13].
A large strand of literature examines FDI in-
flows and investment incentives of developed 
countries, however, fewer studies include devel-
oping countries, which might be due to the lim-
ited number of available data. For Central and 
Eastern European and Baltic countries, Campos 
and Kinoshita found that the main FDI determi-
nants are fewer trade barriers, quality of institu-
tions and reduction of transaction costs. In the 
case of The Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS), natural resources endowment and better in-
frastructure are found to be significant FDI incen-
tives, hence, the resource — seeking motive for 
FDI is prevailing in these countries. Apart from 
that, the weak law enforcement, trade restrictions 
and bureaucracy issues had a negative impact on 
mentioned transition countries’ FDI inflows [14]. 
In other study, Campos and Kinoshita exam-
ined the impact of structural reforms including 
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financial reforms, privatization and trade liber-
alization on FDI inflows to Latin American and 
Eastern European countries. They found that fi-
nancial liberalization and privatization have a sta-
tistically significant impact on FDI. Moreover, fi-
nancial liberalization affects incoming FDI even in 
the case when the financial sector of the country is 
not highly developed [15]. 
In their research, Mariev et. al used the Poisson 
Pseudo Maximum Likelihood method for the esti-
mation of FDI determinants into the Russian econ-
omy. They found that main FDI incentives into the 
Russian Federation are the host region’s GDP per 
capita, the investing country’s market size, trade 
openness of region, distance from Moscow to in-
vesting country, unemployment rate of region, in-
novative capacity approximated as the number of 
people in R&D and FDI inflow in the preceding pe-
riod [16]. 
Additionally to all mentioned factors, which 
stimulate higher FDI inflows, it is highly es-
sential for a country to be competitive on the 
global market. Dunning highlights the contribu-
tion of government to country’s competitiveness: 
“Governments have other critical roles to play, in-
cluding the elimination of structural and insti-
tutional impediments to efficient resource us-
age; to active implementation of market facilitat-
ing measures; and the encouragement of an ethos 
of competitiveness among their constituents.” 
Dunning notes that governments, which were able 
to achieve progress in implementing such reforms, 
became highly attractive for FDI inflows and were 
able to use investments rationally for the benefit 
of their economies [17, p. 14].
On balance, a free trade agreement can re-
sult in trade creation or trade diversion, therefore 
leading to trade of new goods between the FTA 
member countries, which previously was not pos-
sible due to high tariffs before FTA adoption; or to 
switching to inefficient member country from ef-
ficient non-members due to new established high 
external tariffs after FTA adoption. In the case of 
trade, it is clear that integration’s impact can be 
identified by measuring if the trade creation ef-
fect is greater than the trade diversion effect, thus 
estimating the net effect of free trade agreement 
on trade. However, in the case of foreign direct in-
vestment, the FTA’s net effect can hardly be calcu-
lated in such a precise way.
Wonnacott strongly supports the view that 
trade diversion due to free trade agreement adop-
tion might lead to welfare improvement. The 
higher production of exporting member as a re-
sult of trade diversion from a non-member coun-
try will lead to costs reduction, due to which this 
exporting member might turn into the lowest 
source country. Additionally, technical inefficien-
cies’ decline and other members’ costs reduction 
are likely to take place due to markets’ increased 
size and higher competitiveness. Furthermore, the 
exporting member will become more attractive for 
foreign investment with entering the larger mar-
ket of FTA; therefore, it will get more investment 
at less supply price, which in turn leads to reduced 
costs of this member country. This foreign invest-
ment might lead to technology spillover, which 
will cause a further decline in costs [18]. 
One way of better understanding the impact of 
regional trade agreement (RTA) on FDI is to exam-
ine the patterns of FDI flows taking into account 
the level of countries’ economic development in-
volved in the agreement. Blomstrom and Kokko 
analyzed the effect of regional integration on for-
eign direct investment and elaborated a concep-
tual framework, which classifies the regional in-
tegration into three types: North-North, North-
South and South-South. The North-South pat-
tern refers to the agreements in which FDI flows 
from developed countries to developing ones. 
The North-North pattern describes flows within 
the European Union, e.g., where developed coun-
tries invest in developed ones, whereas the South-
South pattern refers to investments from develop-
ing to the developing economies. They claim that 
RTA’s effect on FDI heavily depends on the loca-
tional advantage of a member, environmental re-
forms due to RTA’s adoption and domestic firms’ 
level of competitiveness in the region. The North-
North integration considered inclusion of Canada 
in Canada-U.S. free trade agreement (CUSFTA), in 
which they found that CUSFTA had not consider-
ably change Canada’s FDI flows. They state that 
it is attributable to the fact that trade liberaliza-
tion between two countries had taken place prior 
to the adoption of CUSFTA. The North-South in-
tegration represented by Mexico’s inclusion to the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
led to substantial changes in institutional frame-
work and environmental reforms in Mexico, which 
stimulated higher incoming flows of FDI to Mexico 
from non-member countries. Also in the South-
South integration, which covered MERCOSUR 
(Southern Common Market members: Argentina, 
Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay), the RTA has af-
fected FDI inflows significantly; however, in this 
case, there occurred unequal distribution of FDI 
inflows. Argentina and Brazil obtained larger FDI 
mainly due to their locational advantage and re-
forms targeting macroeconomic stability [19]. 
Blonigen and Davies conducted a research on 
the bilateral tax treaties’ (BTT) effect on FDI of 
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OECD countries and found that a new tax treaty 
formation resulted in FDI decline, which contra-
dicts the traditional view of BTT’s positive impact 
on investment. One of the reasons for which au-
thors indicate that firms will have less opportunity 
to avoid taxes via transfer pricing, furthermore, 
there is a high likelihood of a new treaty to trigger 
the investment uncertainty in the short run until 
the new treaty will be fully in legal force [20]. 
According to Jaumotte, FDI diversion from 
non-member to RTA member countries might 
take place after RTA’s adoption. She notes that the 
member countries with higher financial stability 
and better-educated human capital will attract 
more FDI inflows. The results point that there is 
a high positive effect of the market size of RTA 
on FDI [21]. Another comprehensive analysis of 
preferential trade agreements’ effect on net FDI 
inflows by Medvedev comprised 1994–2000 pe-
riod, when a number of “deep integration” agree-
ments were adopted. The findings are consist-
ent with previous studies; particularly Medvedev 
notes that expanding the size of a common mar-
ket of a preferential trade agreement by 1 percent 
leads to a growth of net incoming FDI flows by ap-
proximately 0.05 percent. In contrast, 1 percent 
increase in distance between the member coun-
tries will cause a reduction in net FDI inflows by 
0.18 percent [22]. 
Egger and Pfaffermayr distinguish ex ante and 
ex post provisions of bilateral investment treaties. 
Ex ante provisions reduce risk in the host coun-
try by insuring transparency, while ex post provi-
sions give MNCs assurance that investments are 
protected from expropriation. Taking the knowl-
edge-capital model as a keystone, they examined 
the effect of bilateral investment treaties adopted 
during 1982–1992 on FDI of OECD and non-OECD 
countries. They used fixed country-pair and time 
effects, and found that the skill difference inter-
action is significant evidence of knowledge-capi-
tal motivations for MNCs. As expected the signa-
ling effect of signing a BIT is less significant than 
the effect of its actual adoption. The findings indi-
cate that ratification of BITs accounts for approx-
imately 30 percent of the overall positive impact 
and a minimum positive effect of 15 percent on 
outward real FDI stocks. Additionally, they note 
that BITs have similar effects on investment flows 
both in intra- and extra-OECD members [23]. 
In a similar vein, Neumayer and Spess analyzed 
the case of BITs on a sample of 119 developing 
countries and found empirical evidence that BITs 
have a positive impact on absolute FDI flows, lead-
ing to the growth of FDI by up to 93 percent. One 
of the main reasons that countries adopt BITs is 
that while developing countries may be willing to 
provide unbiased treatment of foreign firms, after 
the investment was made and MNCs incurred sunk 
costs, an inconsistency problem occurs when the 
host government is no longer motivated to con-
tinue with previous agreements on public asser-
tions. Then there may be an incentive to expropri-
ate or benefit from MNC’s funds. Thus, they note 
that a BIT adoption serves as a signal for inves-
tors that the host country will indeed be provid-
ing unbiased treatment of MNCs and protection 
of their investment. Moreover, they highlight that 
this spillover effect is most likely to spread beyond 
investing developed countries and affect other 
countries’ investments too. The authors also in-
dicate that developing host countries, which have 
adopted a free trade agreement with a developed 
country, are also most likely to receive the higher 
levels of investment flows as it is less cumbersome 
to export domestic production back to the par-
ent or other countries. In addition, in some cases, 
FTAs may include advantageous investment pol-
icy provisions related to MNCs. They found some 
evidence that a high institutional stability of the 
host country and BITs are substitutes, as improve-
ment in government policy leads to a smaller pos-
itive effect of BIT on investment flows [24]. 
Likewise, Busse et al. indicated that bilateral 
investment treaties not only stimulate FDI into 
developing countries, but also might serve as a 
substitute of local institutions [25]. Neumayer et 
al. highlighted that the contagiousness of sign-
ing bilateral investment treaties with stricter in-
vestor-to-state dispute settlement (ISDS) and 
pre-establishment national treatment (NT) provi-
sions among the host developing countries is due 
to competition for FDI originated from one par-
ent country. In contrast, the developing country, 
which previously has already signed treaties with 
weak investment provisions, will tend to sign a 
similar treaty with weak provisions with other de-
veloped country [26]. 
The Jang’s study of OECD and non-OECD coun-
tries examines the impact of FTA on FDI patterns 
between developed-developed countries as well 
as developed-developing countries. Using a dif-
ference-in-difference model for controlling var-
ious factors other than FTA, which might influ-
ence bilateral FDI outflows of the sample coun-
tries, he found that OECD countries that signed 
FTA with each other receive 0.6 percent less FDI, 
whereas extra-OECD countries obtain 0.4 per-
cent more FDI. In the first case, the suppressing 
impact of FTA on FDI will appear in the pre-sign-
ing period and worsens after the FTA adoption, 
whereas in the latter case the positive changes in 
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FDI occur four years after the signing the agree-
ment. Moreover, the FTA’s negative effect on FDI 
is reinforced when the distance between host and 
parent countries is large both in intra- and ex-
tra-OECD patterns, simply due to increased trans-
portation costs, as vertical FDI implies transfer-
ring the intermediate goods to a parent or other 
countries. The skill difference is crucial for vertical 
FDI, as MNCs have an incentive to settle interme-
diate goods production in a host country because 
of the relative wages for unskilled labor decline 
with increasing skill difference between partner 
countries. Jang found that FTA positively affects 
FDI in OECD-developing countries group due to 
large skill differences. On the contrary, FTA led to 
a 1.2 percent decline in FDI in intra OECD flows, 
due to small skill difference between OECD count- 
ries [27].
Trade barriers’ elimination and investment 
provisions’ adoption might cause the rearrange-
ment of foreign direct investment inflows into the 
countries, which became part of a regional inte-
gration. The United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) highlights that direct 
mechanisms, which affect FDI include the follow-
ing measures: investment liberalization, adopting 
protection provisions in regional agreements and 
introduction of broader pan-regional investment 
projects related to infrastructure, research and de-
velopment. On the contrary, the inclusion of trade 
and market integration provisions and policy har-
monization in regional agreements are referred to 
indirect mechanisms. The indicated mechanisms 
affect both intraregional FDI and FDI inflows from 
outside the region [28]. 
As a rule, a number of empirical studies on re-
gional integration highlight the FDI inflows’ in-
crease due to the integration process. The follow-
ing factors as openness to international trade, do-
mestic policies’ reforms aimed at improving the 
business climate and providing better transpar-
ency, as well as economic stability and infrastruc-
ture development are noted to be the triggers for 
foreign investment attraction into the region. The 
other major MNC’s incentives for FDI are loca-
tion advantage and proximity of a host country to 
the parent country; consequently, the larger and 
closer located countries in the region will tend to 
receive higher amounts of FDI. The adoption of in-
vestment provision in regional trade agreements 
will most likely have a direct influence on FDI at-
traction via the enforcement of investment pro-
vision in member countries, while in case of re-
gional trade agreement without such a provision 
the effect on FDI will be indirect as a result of the 
elimination of trade barriers. 
3. The EAEU Countries’ FDI Inflows  
and Investment Climate Characteristics
In 2010, the Customs Union (CU) of the 
Eurasian Economic Community was estab-
lished on the territory of the Republic of Belarus, 
the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian 
Federation with the adoption of the Unified 
Customs Code, under which common regulations 
on import duties, procedures of assessing the im-
ported goods’ value and introducing the country 
of origin became effective. The new regulations 
pertain to the taxes that are collected from mu-
tual trade on the territory of the Customs Union. 
The second stage of integration in the region 
took place in 2012, when 17 international agree-
ments on the Single Economic Space aimed at the 
free circulation of goods, services, capital and la-
bor were introduced 1. 
In January 2015, the new institution of Eurasian 
Economic Union was launched. At present, 
among the members of EAEU are the Republic of 
Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian 
Federation, the Republic of Armenia and Kyrgyz 
Republic. According to the agreement on the im-
port customs duties, common import duties are to 
be paid to the unified account of the CU country, 
which afterwards will be transferred to each coun-
tries budget following the proportion: Armenia — 
1.11 percent; Belarus — 4.56 percent; Kazakhstan 
— 7.11 percent; Kyrgyzstan — 1.9 percent; Russian 
Federation — 85.32 percent 2.
Since the Customs Union adoption in 2010, the 
FDI inflows to Belarus from the EAEU countries 
have not changed considerably. Although, there 
was the highest peak in 2011, when FDI inflows 
from the Russian Federation increased from USD 
934 mln. by three times and reached USD 2 819 
mln., in the following year, FDI inflows shrank to 
the lowest level of USD 470 mln. and in the sub-
sequent period despite a short-term increase, FDI 
inflows from Russia remained at a relatively low 
level. Since 2010, overall FDI inflows to Belarus 
has increased by 18 percent and achieved USD 1 
652 mln. in 2015, conversely FDI inflows from the 
EAEU countries from USD 934 mln. dropped by 
25 percent, to USD 699 mln. For Belarus, the larg-
est investors are the Russian Federation, Cyprus, 
1 Commission Decision of October 18, 2011, №814. «On the en-
try into force of international treaties that form the Common 
Economic Space of Belarus, Kazakhstan and the Russian 
Federation». Retrieved from: http://evrazes.com/docs/view/577 
(date of access: 01.02.2017).
2 Eurasian Economic Commission. (2015). Financial policy in 
Eurasian integration. 56. Retrieved from: http://www.eurasian-
commission.org (date of access: 01.02.2017). 
965Ye. Zh. Akhmetzaki, B. M. Mukhamediyev
ЭКОНОМИКА РЕГИОНА Т. 13, вып. 3 (2017)
Turkey, Germany, Austria, Netherlands, Great 
Britain and Iran 1. 
The major investors of Kazakhstan are from 
Netherlands, France, USA, China, Switzerland, 
Great Britain, the Russian Federation, Italy and 
Canada. Since 2010, the total amount of FDI to 
Kazakhstan almost doubled and reached its high-
est levels of USD 13 760 mln. in 2011–2012, in 
contrast in the subsequent years, FDI inflows 
gradually declined and achieved USD 6 585 mln. in 
2015. Among the EAEU countries, the largest in-
vestor to Kazakhstan is the Russian Federation. 
During 2013–2015, the FDI inflows from Russia 
decreased by more than 1.5, resulting in USD 243 
mln. in 2015. A huge amount of FDI from Germany, 
Netherlands, Ireland, Luxemburg, Cyprus, United 
Kingdom, Switzerland and Austria flowed to the 
Russian Federation before 2014. The overall FDI 
to Russian economy followed an increasing trend 
during 2010–2013 and in 2013 reached its peak of 
USD 69 219 mln., however, in the next year, it was 
followed by a sharp reduction of about 68 percent, 
leading to USD 22 031 mln. On the other hand, 
since the CU became effective in 2010, the FDI in-
flows from the EAEU countries augmented stead-
ily from USD 68.3 mln. by approximately 86 per-
cent and achieved USD 513 mln. in 2015. The larg-
est investor of the Russian Federation from the 
EAEU countries, Kazakhstan, has considerably in-
creased its FDI to Russia from USD 46 mln. to USD 
433 mln. The largest investor among the EAEU 
countries to Kyrgyzstan is the Russian Federation, 
FDI inflows of which since CU adoption increased 
to Kyrgyzstan from USD 50 mln. by about 90 per-
cent and amounted USD 490 mln. in 2015. The 
total FDI to Kyrgyzstan from USD 438 mln. aug-
1 Retrieved from: http://www.eurasiancommission.org (date of 
access: 01.02.2017).
mented by 38 percent, leading to USD 1 142 mln. 
in 2015 2.
During 2010–2015, the total FDI inflows to 
Armenia followed a decreasing trend, from USD 
530 mln. it dropped by 66 percent and in 2015 
achieved the lowest point of USD 178.5 mln. Even 
after the Customs Union adoption the EAEU coun-
tries have not become active investors in Armenia, 
only recently the Russian Federation started in-
vesting in Armenia. In the EAEU intraregional as-
pect, Russian Federation is one of the main FDI in-
vestors, during 2010–2015, the Russian Federation 
invested nearly USD 6 431 mln. in Belarus, and 
USD 3 264 mln. in Kazakhstan, in Armenia and 
Kyrgyzstan USD 725.8 mln. and USD 242.4 mln., 
respectively. In contrast, during the same period, 
Kazakhstan invested in the Russian Federation 
the total sum of USD 1 376 mln. and Belarus in-
vested USD 537 mln. 3 
In order to get a general view of EAEU coun-
tries’ investment climate, it is useful to look 
through doing business indexes. The strength of 
minority investor protection is approximately at 
relatively satisfactory level (6–6.7) in the EAEU 
region; therefore, all the EAEU members should 
further improve the investor protection laws’ en-
forcement so that better regulations will guaran-
tee the investor rights and secure their funds from 
expropriation. Belarus and Kazakhstan have rela-
tively business friendly regulations, and it requires 
less time to register property and get electricity 
in these countries than in other EAEU members. 
Kazakhstan needs to improve reinforcing legal 
rights and accelerate proceeding time of the con-
tract enforcement and construction permits, since 
compared to other EAEU countries, contract en-
2 Retrieved from: http://www.eurasiancommission.org (date of 
access: 01.02.2017).
3 Retrieved from: http://www.eurasiancommission.org (date of 
access: 01.02.2017).
Table 1
Indexes of doing business (2016) for the EAEU countries
2016 indexes Armenia Belarus Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan The Russian Federation
Doing business rank 43 50 51 73 36
Starting a business rank 9 30 54 28 37
Dealing with construction 
permits (days) 84.0 115.0 151.0 142.0 244.1
Getting electricity (days) 138.0 112.0 91.0 125.0 160.5
Registering property (days) 7.0 3.0 4.5 3.5 15.0
Strength of minority investor 
protection index (0–10) 6.0 5.8 6.7 6.3 6.0
Enforcing contracts (days) 570.0 275.0 370.0 410.0 307.0
Resolving insolvency (years) 1.9 3.0 1.5 1.5 2.0
Source: Doing business data.
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forcement and dealing with construction permits 
in Kazakhstan is time-consuming — 370 and 151 
days respectively 1. 
Time to resolve insolvency is twice larger 
in Belarus, 3 years, than in Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan, where the resolution of insolvency 
takes 1.5 years. In Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, it 
takes 570 and 410 days respectively to enforce 
a contract, which must give investors concern 
(Table 1) 2. 
4. Methodology
Model 1. Potential FDI determinants  
and Eurasian economic integration 
For the estimation of FDI determinants and 
Eurasian economic integration effect on FDI in-
flows, the panel dataset includes the EAEU 
members (Kazakhstan, Belarus, the Russian 
Federation, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan) and other coun-
tries (Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Moldova, Georgia, 
Ukraine). The annual data (1993–2015) of foreign 
direct investment and gross domestic product 
are in USD, constant 2016 prices collected from 
Euromonitor International Database. 
The regression form will be as follows:
fdiit = α + β1gdpit + β2opentrit + β3teleit + β4educit +
+ β5popit + β6cut + β7educit · cut + εit          (1)
where i — country index (the panels) and t — time 
index; εit — error term.
fdiit is a foreign direct investment of country i 
at period t. The market size of a host country is ex-
pressed as (gdpit) gross domestic product of coun-
try i at time t. openrit is a trade openness index (% 
of GDP), which is the sum of exports and imports 
of goods and services measured as a share of the 
country’s gross domestic product, collected from 
the World Bank data. The level of infrastructure 
development is approximated by the countries’ 
fixed telephone subscriptions (teleit). The level of 
education attainment is approximated by educit — 
enrollment in secondary education of country i at 
period t, is from the World Bank Education statis-
tics. popit — total population of country i at time t, 
also from World Bank. The Eurasian economic in-
tegration dummy is included as cut, takes value of 
0 before the Customs Union creation and 1 after 
year 2010, denoting the establishment of Customs 
Union. 
1 Retrieved from: http://www.doingbusiness.org/data (date of 
access: 01.02.2017).
2 Retrieved from: http://www.doingbusiness.org/data (date of 
access: 01.02.2017).
The hypothesis regarding the country specific 
determinants: 
H1: Foreign direct investment is positively re-
lated to market size, infrastructure development 
and secondary education attainment. 
Since most free trade agreements promote for-
eign direct investment into the region, we expect 
that the Customs Union of the Eurasian Economic 
Community will have a positive statistically sig-
nificant impact on FDI inflows. Therefore:
H2: The Customs Union is positively related to 
FDI inflows. 
Results
According to the correlation statistics, there 
is a high positive correlation between fdi and gdp 
(0.81), also between fdi and tele (0.80). FDI and 
population have a low correlation (0.68). Trade 
openness index and educ (secondary education 
enrollment) have a low correlation with fdi (-0.36) 
and (0.54) respectively. The high correlation be-
tween tele and educ (0.89) can be explained by the 
fact that the secondary education enrollment may 
proxy for the population size. The Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller and PP-Fisher test conducted indi-
vidually on each variable indicated that there is a 
unit root at levels in all variables except for popu-
lation (pop) (Table 2). 
The results of equation 1, which was calculated 
by the least squares method with cross-section 
and period fixed effects, indicate that the GDP, 
secondary education enrollment and infrastruc-
ture development are statistically significant at 
1 percent level and have a positive sign (Table 3, 
Equation 1). The interaction term (d(educ) · cu) is 
not significant. The Eurasian economic integra-
tion dummy (cu) is statistically significant at 5 
percent level and it negatively affects FDI. 
Table 2
The results of unit root tests
Variable ADF — Fisher Chi-square
PP — Fisher 
Chi-square
fdi 23.71 (0.25) 26.22 (0.15)
d(fdi) 89.65 (0.00) 307.16 (0.00)
gdp 4.35 (0.99) 2.35 (1.00)
d(gdp) 69.70 (0.00) 129.51 (0.00)
opentr 18.85 (0.53) 19.28 (0.50)
d(opentr) 157.67 (0.00) 173.0 (0.00)
tele 13.98 (0.83) 7.33 (0.99)
d(tele) 36.65 (0.01) 60.1 (0.00)
educ 42.81 (0.002) 1.87 (1.00)
d(educ) 44.85 (0.001) 74.81 (0.00)
pop 42.25 (0.00) 47.41 (0.00)
Source: Calculated by the authors in Eviews. The p-values are 
given in brackets.
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The coefficient of the determinant, R-squared 
equals 0.49, hence the proportion of variance in 
FDI variable explained by independent variables 
is relatively satisfactory for the panel estimation. 
The Durbin-Watson statistic equals 2.2, which in-
dicates no positive autocorrelation but may not 
rule out negative autocorrelation. Since the trade 
openness variable (d(opentr)) is not statistically 
significant, in equation 2 this variable is excluded. 
As expected, we get similar results as in equation 1 
(Table 3, Equation 2). The equation 3 is calculated 
by excluding the insignificant interaction term 
(d(educ) · cu), the obtained results are identical to 
previous equation output, except for the Eurasian 
economic integration dummy (cu), which became 
insignificant (Table 3, Equation 3). 
Model 2. The natural experiment model: 
Eurasian economic integration effect on FDI 
J. Wooldridge used the “natural experiment” 
method for the estimation of a policy change ef-
fect in a country, by including the treatment 
and control groups [29]. For the estimation of 
Eurasian economic integration effect on FDI in-
flows, the panel dataset includes 5 members of 
Eurasian Economic Union (Kazakhstan, Belarus, 
the Russian Federation, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia) 
and 8 other countries (Azerbaijan, Mongolia, 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Georgia, 
Moldova, Ukraine). The annual data (1993–2015) 
for foreign direct investment inflows in USD mln. 
at constant 2016 prices and gross domestic prod-
uct in USD mln. at constant 2016 prices, was col-
lected from Euromonitor International Database. 
The treatment group (T) underwent a change 
in government’s policy and a control group 
(C) was not affected by the policy change. The 
Eurasian Economic Union members refer to group 
T, and eight other countries refer to group C. The 
two dummy variables denote: d1i — takes value of 
1 for a member of the Customs Union and other-
wise 0; d2t — equals 1 for years after creation of 
the Customs Union, which are years after 2010 and 
otherwise 0. The regression will be as follows: 
fdiit = α + β1gdpit + β2d1i + β3d2t + β4d1i · d2t + εit (2)
where i — country index (the panels) and t — time 
index. 
In this model, the following hypothesis will be 
tested: 
H1: The Customs Union has a significant posi-
tive impact on FDI inflows. 
The Customs Union (integration) effect on FDI 
will be reflected in the coefficient β4, which meas-
ures changes in FDI amounts due to Eurasian eco-
nomic integration, by controlling both for fixed ef-
fects of estimated countries and for time effects 
after 2010. 
Results
 The unit root test conducted individually on 
fdi and gdp indicated that there is a unit root at 
Table 3
Model 1. The regression analysis results on potential FDI determinants of the EAEU countries
Variable Equation 1 Equation 2 (excluding trade openness) 
Equation 3 (excluding trade 












































Interaction term (d(educ)∙cu) –56948.46(41020.00)
–56815.86
(40752.11)
Observations 175 177 177
R2 0.49 0.49 0.47
Source: Calculated by the authors in Eviews. Standard errors are given in brackets. *** Significance at the 1 % level; ** Significance at 
the 5 % level; * Significance at the 10 % level.
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levels. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller and PP-
Fisher test on fdi at levels showed p = 0.25 > 0.05 
and p = 0.30 > 0.05 respectively, hence there is 
a unit root. After taking the first difference, the 
unit root is eliminated. Similarly, after taking 
first difference of gdp, ADF p = 0.0000 < 0.05 and 
PP Fisher p = 0.0000, hence there is no unit root 
(Table 4).
According to the results of equation 1 of Model 
2, the Eurasian economic integration, reflected by 
Customs Union interaction term (d1 · d2),is sta-
tistically significant at 1 percent level, therefore, 
indicating that the Eurasian economic integra-
tion had significant negative effect on FDI inflows 
(Table 5, Equation 1). 
The gross domestic product (d(gdp)) is statisti-
cally significant at 1 percent level, hence the mar-
ket size is a major FDI determinant in the region. 
R-squared equals 0.53; the explanatory power 
of the estimated regression is relatively satis-
factory for panel estimation. DW statistic = 1.8, 
which indicates no serial correlation. (d1) which 
is a dummy for Customs Union membership is sta-
tistically significant at 10 percent level and has a 
positive sign. The time effects dummy (d2) is in-
significant. In equation 2, we applied the White 
cross-section standard errors and obtained the 
identical estimation results as in equation 1, ex-
cept for the Customs Union membership (d1), 
which is now statistically significant at 5 percent 
level (Table 5, Equation 2). As expected, when ex-
cluding the time effects dummy (d2), the results 
remained the same (Table 5, equation 3). 
5. Discussion and Implications
This paper examines the foreign direct invest-
ment determinants of the Eurasian Economic 
Union members and several CIS countries and, 
further, provides the estimation of Eurasian eco-
nomic integration effect on FDI inflows. Model 
1 results point to the factors, which significantly 
affect investors’ decisions, in particular: mar-
ket size, infrastructure development and second-
ary education enrollment. A large market ap-
peared to be the main FDI incentive for the EAEU 
region and other CIS countries; hence, the mar-
ket-seeking FDI is prevailing in these countries. 
Apart from that, a better infrastructure is also im-
portant due to lower production costs. The high 
secondary education attainment in the coun-
try suggests a well-educated cheap labor force, 
which also favorably affects multinational com-
panies’ decision for FDI. According to these out-
comes, the resource-seeking FDI is common for 
examined countries. In line with several empiri-
cal studies discussed in a literature review of this 
paper, we tested a hypothesis on a positive im-
pact of Customs Union on FDI inflows. The re-
sults of model 1 show that the Customs Union of 
the Eurasian Economic Community negatively af-
fected FDI inflows to the region. 
Table 4
The results of unit root tests 
Variable ADF — Fisher Chi-square
PP — Fisher 
Chi-square
fdi 30.24 (0.25) 29.05 (0.30)
d(fdi) 120.0 (0.00) 340.3 (0.00)
gdp 4.37 (1.00) 2.35 (1.00)
d(gdp) 74.83 (0.00) 136.98 (0.00)
Source: Calculated by the authors in Eviews. The p-values are 
given in brackets.
Table 5
Model 2. The results of “natural experiment” model of Eurasian economic integration effect on FDI inflows
Variable Equation 1 
Equation 2 (with white 
cross-section standard 
errors)
Equation 3 (with white cross-
section standard errors, excluding 

































Observations 283 283 283
R2 0.53 0.53 0.54
Source: Calculated by the authors in Eviews. Standard errors are given in brackets. *** Significance at the 1 % level; ** Significance at 
the 5 % level; * Significance at the 10 % level.
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The aim of the natural experiment (model 2) 
was to identify if the Eurasian economic integra-
tion, reflected by the Customs Union interaction 
term, had a significant impact on FDI inflows while 
controlling for both country and time effects. We 
rejected the hypothesis on the positive impact of 
Customs Union on incoming FDI flows into the 
EAEU region, as according to estimation results, 
the overall effect of Customs Union (d1 · d2) on 
FDI inflows into the EAEU countries appeared to 
be negative. Additionally, the estimation results 
refer to the fact that the EAEU members seem 
to attract more FDI than other CIS countries due 
to their long-lasting institutions, which was re-
flected by (d1) dummy. The overall development 
of long-lasting institutions in EAEU countries, 
which were established before the EAEU adop-
tion, exerted a positive effect on FDI. The possi-
ble examples of such institutions are the protec-
tion of property rights and dispute settlement, 
which might play a crucial role in attracting FDI. 
Furthermore, the results indicate that the time ef-
fects dummy (d2) is not a significant factor in in-
vestors’ decisions for FDI. 
Most EAEU members have a satisfactory level 
of doing business rank and strength of minority 
investor protection. Nevertheless, there are other 
factors, which affect setting up a new business 
such as enforcing contracts, dealing with con-
struction permits, getting electricity and resolv-
ing insolvencies, which require a lot of time. In or-
der to attract higher investment flows, it is nec-
essary to reduce the quantity of time-consuming 
procedures and adopt domestic policies aimed at 
improving the country’s business climate. Recall 
that the EAEU Treaty already includes the invest-
ment section, which guarantees the provision of 
unbiased treatment for investing member states, 
protection of member state firms’ property from 
expropriation and ensures just settlement of dis-
putes. Kheifetz highlighted that the other possi-
ble way to stimulate FDI inflows to the Eurasian 
Economic Union would be to establish a free in-
vestment zone in the EAEU and further encourage 
a free movement of capital among members [30]. 
For further research, it would be interesting to 
incorporate in the model such variables as the rule 
of law, level of transparency index, and the ease of 
doing business index. The new estimation will ex-
amine if these domestic policy variables are sig-
nificant in attracting FDI to the EAEU countries. 
Additionally, the other possible research subject is 
to include the interest rate spread between coun-
tries, in order to identify if FDI inflows are respon-
sive to them. 
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